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INTRoDucnoN 
Insurance policies that are written specifically to provide cov­
erage for employment practices liability claims such as wrongful 
discharge, discrimination, and harassment are a relatively recent 
phenomenon. These employment practices liability ("EPL") insur­
ance policies were first introduced in the early 1990's. Prior to the 
widespread availability of EPL policies, coverage for employment­
related claims was typically sought under one or more of the follow­
ing policy types: 
• Commercial General Liability ("CGL") 
• Umbrella and Excess Liability 
• Homeowners' Liability 
• Workers' 	 Compensation ("WC") and Employers' Liability 
("EL") 
• Directors' and Officers' Liability ("0&0") 
Employers continue to seek coverage under these policies for em­
ployment practices liability claims, leading to a substantial amount 
of litigation and case law development. In contrast, there has yet to 
be any case law in the form of officially published judicial decisions 
* The opinions expressed in this Article are those of the authors, individually 
and collectively, and do not necessarily reflect those of Reliance National, Blackmoor 
Group, Inc., or any affiliated insurer in the Reliance group of insurance companies with 
respect to any insurance policy. The authors do not purport to restate, explain, or 
interpret any insurance policy issued by a member company in the Reliance group. 
** Joseph P. Monteleone is Senior Vice President and Underwriting Counsel at 
Kemper Insurance. 
*** Emy Poulad Grotell is Vice President and Claims Counsel at Blackmoor 
Group, Inc. in New York. 
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under any of the EPL policy forms introduced over the past several 
years. Thus, this Article will examine the coverage issues that arise 
under each of these policies in the context of various employment 
practices liability claims. With the advent of EPL insurance, certain 
changes have been made to the forms of these policies, particularly 
in the case of commercial general liability forms,l to ensure that 
they do not overlap with EPL insurance. Nonetheless, these 
changes are not universal and it behooves the policyholder and the 
EPL insurer to examine these other sources of insurance for em­
ployment claims. It is probably fair to state that insurers under 
these policies never intended to provide coverage for employment 
practices claims and will resist attempts to secure the coverage for a 
given claim, quite often successfully in light of the cases discussed in 
this Article. Consequently, it would not be wise to rely upon any of 
these policies as a substitute for EPL insurance despite the occa­
sional case law finding coverage under some variations of these pol­
icies for particular employment claims. 
I. COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY POLICIES 
The commercial general liability policy ("CGL"), previously 
known as the comprehensive general liability policy, is a policy held 
by virtually every business in the United States to protect it from a 
variety of negligence-based civil liability claims. The CGL policy 
has two primary coverage parts. The first part, referred to as "Cov­
erage A: Bodily Injury and Property Damage Liability," generally 
provides coverage for "bodily injury" or "property damage"2 
caused by an accident resulting from an insured's negligent conduct. 
It is usually under this part of the CGL policy that coverage is pro­
vided for premises liability and products liability claims. The sec­
ond coverage part, "Coverage B: Personal and Advertising Injury 
Liability," provides coverage for specifically enumerated torts 
which are committed by an insured in the course of its business or 
in the course of advertising its goods, products, or services. In the 
context of employment-related claims, coverage is typically sought 
under the Coverage A section of the CGL. Additionally and alter­
natively, and especially where an employment-related claim in­
cludes elements of a personal injury tort, such as defamation, 
coverage may be sought under Coverage B. Attempts to secure 
1. See infra notes 62-68 and accompanying text. 
2. See infra Part LA for discussion of what constitutes "bodily injury" and "prop­
erty damage" under a COL policy. 
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CGL coverage for employment practices liability claims have been 
met with mixed results for a number of reasons. 
A. Coverage A: Bodily Injury and Property Damage Liability 
1. Defining Property Damage 
Coverage A provides coverage for "bodily injury" or "property 
damage" which is caused by an "occurrence." The term "property 
damage" will not, generally, trigger coverage for employment prac­
tices claims since it requires that the claimant seek damages for 
physical injury to, or the loss or use of, tangible property. Courts 
have uniformly held that economic loss alone will not trigger cover­
age for "property damage."3 As such, claims by an employee or 
former employee seeking back payor loss of benefits will not trig­
ger coverage under "property damage."4 
2. Defining Bodily Injury 
The term "bodily injury" is generally defined as "bodily injury, 
sickness or disease sustained by any person."5 Most wrongful em­
ployment claims allege emotional distress and/or mental anguish, 
but a majority of jurisdictions hold that allegations of purely emo­
tional distress or mental anguish do not satisfy a claim for "bodily 
injury."6 As one court stated: '''[b]odily injury' ... is a narrow term 
and encompasses only physical injuries to the body and the conse­
quences thereof."7 A majority of courts, however, have found cov­
erage when the allegations for emotional distress or mental anguish 
3. See, e.g., Lassen Canyon Nursery, Inc. v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 720 F.2d 1016, 
1018 (9th Cir. 1983); Hommel v. George, 802 P.2d 1156, 1158 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990); L. 
Ray Packing Co. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 469 A.2d 832, 834 (Me. 1983). 
4. See Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. First Sec. Bank, 662 F. Supp. 1126, 1130 (D. 
Mont. 1987) (finding that lost wages and diminished earning capacity do not constitute 
"property damage"); Lamar-Truck Plaza, Inc. v. Sentry Ins., 757 P.2d 1143, 1144 (Colo. 
Ct. App. 1988) (finding damages claimed by employee for alleged sexual discrimination 
and harassment were purely economic and, therefore, not within definition of "property 
damage"); Southeastern Color Lithographers, Inc. v. Graphic Arts Mut. Ins. Co., 296 
S.E.2d 378, 380 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982) (finding that economic losses sustained because job 
offer was rescinded do not fall within definition of "property damage"). 
5. Throughout the discussion of CGL we quote from the standard CGL forms 
issued by the Insurance Organization Services, Inc. ("ISO"). ISO is an organization 
which drafts various forms for many types of insurance. Many insurance companies will 
either use ISO forms in issuing their CGL policies or model their own CGL policies 
from ISO forms. 
6. See, e.g., AIM Ins. Co. v. Culcasi, 280 Cal. Rptr. 766 (1991) (citing to the deci­
sions of a majority of courts finding that emotional distress alone does not trigger cover­
age for "bodily injury"). 
7. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Diamant, 518 N.E.2d 1154, 1156 (Mass. 1988). 
252 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21:249 
are accompanied by physical manifestations.8 Only a minority of 
jurisdictions have found coverage under "bodily injury" where the 
plaintiff alleges emotional distress or mental anguish absent physi­
cal manifestations.9 
What constitutes a physical manifestation to invoke coverage 
under "bodily injury" is not well-defined.lO The ambiguity is best 
exemplified by two cases decided by the New Jersey Supreme Court 
which addressed the types of injuries that satisfy the definition of 
"bodily injury." In Voorhees v. Preferred Mutual Insurance Co.,n 
the court held that the plaintiffs, who claimed emotional distress, 
and who only alleged remote physical manifestations (e.g., nausea, 
headache, depression, and bodily pain), did in fact trigger coverage 
under the CGL policy.12 But, on the same day, in SL Industries, 
Inc. v. American Motorists Insurance Co.,n the same court held that 
a claim of emotional anguish, which caused sleeplessness, lacked 
sufficient physical manifestations to trigger "bodily injury" 
coverage.14 
Other courts have not focused on the distinction between phys­
ical bodily injury and emotional distress, but have instead elected to 
examine the basic core of the allegations in an effort to determine 
whether bodily injury coverage is triggered. A leading decision in 
8. See, e.g., Citizens Ins. Co. of Am. v. Leiendecker, 962 S.W.2d 446, 454 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1998) (stating that the common meaning of "bodily injury" refers only to "physi­
cal conditions of the body"); Garvis v. Employers Mut. Cas. Co., 497 N.W.2d 254 
(Minn. 1993) (stating that emotional distress is not an injury to the body but to the 
psyche and does not trigger coverage for "bodily injury"); AIM Ins. Co., 280 Cal. Rptr. 
at 774-75 (finding that emotional distress accompanied by physical manifestation is cov­
ered under "bodily injury"); E-Z Loader Boat Trailers, Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 726 
P.2d 439, 443 (Wash. 1986) ("[CGL] coverage contemplated actual bodily injury, sick­
ness or disease resulting in physical impairment, as contrasted to mental impairment."). 
9. See, e.g., General Accident Ins. Co. of Am. v. Gastineau, 990 F. Supp. 631 
(S.D. Ind. 1998) (stating that allegations of emotional distress in context of hostile work 
place and sexual harassment triggered coverage for "bodily injury" because of physical 
contact); Lavanant v. General Accident Ins. Co. of Am., 595 N.E.2d 819, 822-23 (N.Y. 
1992) (finding definition of "bodily injury" encompasses mental anguish under CGL 
policy); Loewenthal v. Security Ins. Co., 436 A.2d 493, 499 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1981) 
(stating that "bodily injury" encompasses a claim of pain, suffering, and mental anguish 
under CGL policy). 
10. Some carriers will endorse their policies to redefine "bodily injury" to clearly 
indicate that emotional distress and mental anguish are covered only when they result 
from a physical harm, sickness, or disease. 
11. 607 A.2d 1255 (N.J. 1992). 
12. See id. at 1262. 
13. 607 A.2d 1266 (N.J. 1992). 
14. See id. at 1274. The court distinguished Voorhees by explaining that in that 
case emotional distress resulted in physical manifestations, whereas in SL Industries, 
sleeplessness was an emotional condition, not a physical one. See id. at 1273. 
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this area is Waller v. Truck Insurance Exchange, Inc.,15 which con­
sidered whether allegations of emotional and physical distress trig­
gered a duty to defend under a CGL policy. The court had little 
trouble in following the majority of courts by holding that only alle­
gations of physical distress bring the claim into the realm of covered 
bodily injury.16 
However, the court then proceeded to hold that where the gra­
vamen of the underlying suit was economic loss, the alleged emo­
tional and physical distress was a mere "by-product" of the 
economic lossY The court stated, "[w]e cannot torture the duty to 
defend by allowing pleadings of emotional and physical distress re­
sulting from financial injury to convert uncovered claims for eco­
nomic losses into potentially covered claims for bodily injury."18 
Waller seems to support the view that merely tangential allegations 
of emotional and/or physical injury should not be determinative of 
coverage. The key, however, is whether or not the emotional or 
physical injury derives solely from the alleged economic loss. Tak­
ing employment practices claims as an example, the plaintiff's al­
leged "bodily injury" may not always derive solely from the alleged 
economic loss, particularly where the emotional distress and/or 
physical injury is allegedly inflicted before the claimant is termi­
nated from employment. 
While most courts will look to see if a plaintiff's complaint al­
leges elements of physical injuries, Waller and its progeny appear to 
present the better view because they do not permit coverage to be 
determined by the fortuity of a plaintiff's pleadings, but rather, they 
attempt to objectively assess the gravamen of the claim. 
3. The Occurrence Requirement 
Even where the wrongful employment claim triggers coverage 
for "bodily injury," typically the CGL policy also requires that such 
"bodily injury" be caused by an "occurrence." "Occurrence" is de­
fined as "an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to 
15. 900 P.2d 619 (Cal. 1995), a!f'g, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 692 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994); see 
also Keating v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 995 F.2d 154, 156 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding 
emotional and physical distress suffered by investors, which arose from economic loss, 
was not covered under CGL policy since "[i]t would expand coverage of these policies 
far beyond any reasonable expectation of the parties"); Chatton v. National Union Fire 
Ins. Co., 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 318, 328 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992). 
16. See Waller, 900 P.2d at 630. 
17. See id. 
18. Waller, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 697. 
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substantially the same general harmful conditions."19 Generally, 
the use of the word "accident" in the definition of "occurrence" has 
been a basis upon which courts have held that coverage under Cov­
erage A should be limited to fortuitous acts, and should exclude 
intentional acts, such as termination of employment and disparate 
treatment discrimination.2°Thus, some courts have held that the 
wrongful termination of employment is not an "occurrence" since it 
does not occur accidentally, but rather, intentionally. For example, 
in Sage Co. v. Insurance Co. of North America,21 the Minnesota 
Appellate Court held that firing an employee was "the antithesis of 
an accident," and therefore, any alleged bodily injury was not 
caused by an "occurrence."22 As to other types of employment 
practices claims, to determine if there is an "occurrence," courts 
will often look to the factual allegations, as opposed to the nomen­
clature of the cause of action. For example, when all the factual 
allegations in the complaint are premised on intentional discrimina­
tion and harassment, an allegation of negligence may not trigger 
coverage. 
In Society of Mount Carmel v. National Ben Franklin Insurance 
Co.,23 a California high school teacher brought a wrongful termina­
tion suit. The employer in the underlying claim sought coverage 
19. Prior to the November 1985 ISO Form, "occurrence" was defined as an "acci­
dent ... neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured." In 1985, 
ISO changed its definition and the latter part of the definition was made into an 
exclusion. 
20. Courts will look at the allegations of the complaint to determine whether the 
alleged discrimination is considered "disparate treatment" or "disparate impact." Dis­
parate treatment may include actions such as the firing of an employee because of his or 
her race, gender, national origin, or ethnicity. In order to establish a claim for disparate 
treatment, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant intended the wrongful act. On 
the other hand, disparate impact discrimination occurs when the employer has a policy 
which is neutral on its face but nonetheless has a discriminatory effect. Under disparate 
impact discrimination the claimant does not need to prove intent, only the discrimina­
tory effect of the policy. See, e.g., Solo Cup Co. v. Federal Ins. Co., 619 F.2d 1178 (7th 
Cir.1980). 
21. 480 N.W.2d 695 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992); see also Smithway Motor Xpress, Inc. 
v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 484 N.W.2d 192, 194-95 (Iowa 1992); Loyola Marymount Univ. 
v. Hartford Accident and Indem. Co., 271 Cal. Rptr. 528, 532 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) 
("Intentional discharge does not become an accidental occurrence even if it causes un­
intended damages ...."); Kilgore v. Resumix, Inc., Mealey's Emerging Disputes, Vol. 3, 
Issue #5, at A-I (Mass. Super. Ct. Apr. 16, 1998) (finding that negligence count did not 
allege acts separate from termination and, therefore, there was no covered accident). 
But see Maine Bonding & Cas. Co. v. Douglas Dynamics, Inc., 594 A.2d 1079 (Me. 
1991) (finding that wrongful discharge may be a covered "occurrence" where there is 
no finding of subjective intent to cause harm). 
22. See Sage Co., 480 N.W.2d at 698. 
23. 643 N.E.2d 1280 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994). 
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under CGL, workers' compensation, and umbrella policies issued 
by the insurer defendants in the coverage action. The most impor­
tant issue for the CGL insurers was the court's holding as to 
whether there was a duty to defend under the CGL policy when a 
single count in the underlying complaint alleged negligent infliction 
of emotional distress. 
Citing California precedent, the court held that a CGL policy 
offered no coverage for a wrongful termination claim because the 
intentional act of termination did not constitute an occurrence 
under the policy.24 In addressing the allegation of negligence, the 
court held that it was necessary to "look beyond the pleadings to 
determine if the allegations of negligence contained therein are 
based on separate negligent acts, or are just merely intentional acts 
which have been labeled as negligent."25 The court further stated: 
Here, Gabriel's [the underlying plaintiff] complaint seeks recov­
ery for negligent infliction of emotional distress. However, the 
complaint sets forth no negligent acts or any facts from which 
such negligence can be inferred. Rather, the acts upon which 
that count is based are the very same acts which underlie every 
other count of Gabriel's complaint, the intentional discharge. 
Thus, the count alleging negligent infliction of emotional distress 
does not constitute an occurrence or accident under the terms of 
the comprehensive general liability policy, and the trial court was 
incorrect in so finding.26 
This decision is important to consider because it suggests that even 
what may otherwise be pejoratively called a "throwaway" allega­
tion of negligence can nevertheless provide a basis for the CGL in­
surer to defend. While the Illinois court's interpretation of 
California law has little authority in California itself, the court ap­
peared to correctly interpret California precedent.27 
Issues similar to those addressed in Society of Mount Carmel 
were also resolved in other significant decisions. In State Farm Fire 
24. See id. at 1289. 
25. Id. 
26. Id. 
27. See generally State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Panko, No. C-94-2040, 1996 WL 
162977, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 1996) (refusing to consider a potential claim for negli­
gence as triggering coverage under the policy for claim of wrongful termination, sexual 
harassment, and gender discrimination since the alleged facts would not support it); 
Quan v. Truck Ins. Exch., 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 134 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (finding that allega­
tion of negligence alone does not trigger coverage; rather, it is the alleged acts or con­
duct that determines whether there is an accident). 
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& Casualty Co. v. Compupay, Inc.,28 a Florida appellate court con­
sidered the availability of coverage for claims arising from sexual 
harassment and sex discrimination, under a "business liability insur­
ance policy," which is similar to a standard CGL form. The court 
determined that discrimination and harassment were akin to sexual 
abuse in that there is an inherent intent to harm the victim, and 
therefore, they are intentional acts as a matter of law.29 Finding 
that the employer-insured was well aware of the conduct of the har­
asser, the court appeared not to give any weight to the fact that the 
plaintiff pled at least one count of negligence based upon the em­
ployer's decision to continue to retain the harasser in its employ. 
As in the cases exploring the bodily injury trigger noted above, de­
cisions such as Society of Mount Carmel evidence a willingness by 
some courts to look beyond the allegations framed within the four 
comers of the complaint, and do not allow a "negligent tail" to wag 
the "intentional dog."30 
In some instances, courts have also denied coverage because 
the allegations are so offensive that coverage would be barred by 
public policy. For example, California Insurance Code section 533 
provides: "An insurer is not liable for a loss caused by the willful 
. act of the insured; but [the insurer] is not exonerated by the negli­
gence of the insured, or the insured's agents or others." In Coit 
Drapery Cleaners, Inc. v. Sequoia Insurance CO.,31 the sole owner 
and CEO of the employer/defendant perpetuated an offensive sex­
28. 654 So. 2d 944 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995). 
29. See id. at 947; U.S. Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Val-Blue Corp., 647 N.E.2d 1342 
(N.Y. 1995) (holding that there is no coverage under CGL policy for allegations of 
negligent hiring, supervision, and retention against employer where underlying claim 
involved shooting by employee; the assault exclusion encompassed the plethora of 
claims asserted in underlying complaint); see also Comhill Ins. PLC v. Valsamis, Inc., 
106 F.3d 80 (5th Cir. 1997) (applying Texas law and concluding that where a claim for 
negligent infliction of emotional distress, negligent hiring, and supervision is interre­
lated to sexual harassment, there can be no "occurrence" for purposes of coverage); 
Public Servo Mut. Ins. CO. V. Camp Raleigh, Inc., 650 N.Y.S.2d 136 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1996) (holding that allegations of negligent hiring, retention, and supervision are not 
covered "occurrences" where underlying claim is for sexual abuse). 
30. See Society of Mount Carmel V. National Ben Franklin Ins. Co., 643 N.E.2d 
1280 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994). On the other hand, there are some courts that find coverage 
even when there are no allegations of negligence. See General Accident Ins. Co. of 
Am. V. Gastineau, 990 F. Supp. 631 (S.D. Ind. 1998) (recognizing the standard for em­
ployer liability for hostile work environment under Title VII is negligence and, there­
fore, a covered occurrence); Duff Supply CO. V. Crum & Forster Ins. Co., No. CIV.A. 
96-8481, 1997 WL 255483 (E.D. Pa. May 8, 1997) (finding allegations of recklessness in 
context of violation of Title VII is a covered "occurrence"). 
31. 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 692 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993). 
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ually hostile workplace. The court not only found the individual's 
conduct uninsurable, but also declined to find the corporate em­
ployer/defendant within the possible scope of insurance because: (i) 
it was the alter ego of the harasser, and (ii) no cause of action for 
negligent supervision or other non-intentional corporate conduct 
was pled or indeed could successfully have been pled given the de­
gree of control the harasser had over the corporation. The court 
also held that coverage would be barred by section 533: 
[W]e seriously question whether section 533 would ever permit 
insurance coverage for any intentional course of conduct, as evi­
denced by this record, consisting of a long pattern of behavior of 
sexual discrimination and sexual harassment by a corporation's 
high managerial agents which have been known, ratified, and 
condoned by the corporation.32 
While the court acknowledged Coit's argument that section 533 did 
not forbid the insurer from providing a defense, given the egregious 
facts in Coit, the court stated: "[W]here ... both statute and public 
policy bar any possibility of indemnity for conduct which is in­
separably intentional, there is also no duty to defend."33 
Courts are more likely to provide coverage where the allega­
tions of discrimination are not premised on intentional wrongdoing. 
In Save Mart Supermarkets v. Underwriters at Lloyd's London,34 
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Cali­
fornia distinguished between "intentional" wrongful conduct, which 
is clearly uninsurable under section 533, and "accidental" wrongful 
conduct. The court held that coverage for unintentional disparate 
impact discrimination was permitted under section 53335 and noted 
that "the policy of discouraging wilful torts would not be furthered, 
if coverage for unintentional discrimination was barred by § 533."36 
Similarly, in Melugin v. Zurich Canada,37 the California Court 
of Appeals held that coverage under a CGL policy for alleged gen­
der and pregnancy discrimination was not precluded by section 533 
where the employee-claimant contended that inept and unfair per­
sonnel management policies caused the alleged discriminatory re­
sult. In upholding coverage, the court emphasized that the CGL 
policy at issue expressly expanded the available coverage to include 
32. Id. at 704. 
33. Id. at 705 n.3. 
34. 843 F. Supp. 597 (N.D. Cal. 1994). 
35. See id. at 606. 
36. Id. 
37. 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 781 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996). 
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claims for "discrimination ... violation of civil rights, [and] sexual 
discrimination," to the extent "insurance against [the] same is not 
prohibited by law."38 Thus, where the underlying claim for discrim­
ination is not premised on intentional wrongdoing, California 
courts may provide at least a duty to defend.39 
The United States Supreme Court recently rendered two deci­
sions which held that employers could be liable for the illegal 
harassing behavior of supervisors even when management had no 
idea that it was occurring and were not negligent in any way.40 An 
employer who was not aware of the harassing behavior, but is none­
theless liable because it failed to provide a reasonable complaint 
procedure to aggrieved employees, will probably be likened to the 
employer who had a policy which was neutral on its face but was 
discriminatory in its effect. Like the "disparate impact" discrimina­
tion cases, where an employer is not aware of the harassing behav­
ior, courts may find a covered occurrence and, therefore, a duty to 
defend. However, a court following the reasoning of Society of 
Mount Carmel and similar decisions may hold that there is still 
neither a covered occurrence nor a duty to defend, since despite the 
lack of apparent culpability on the part of the employer or, at best, 
mere negligence, there is still an underlying intentional wrongful act 
on the part of a supervisory employee within the organization. 
4. 	 Employers' Liability Exclusion 
Even in those situations where a claim for an employment 
practice is found to constitute an occurrence resulting in bodily in­
jury, such a claim may be barred because of the employer's liability 
exclusion found under Coverage A. Specifically, the exclusion 
states, in relevant part, that the policy does not apply to: 
"Bodily injury" to 
(1) 	an "employee" of the insured arising out of and in the course 
of: 
38. 	 Id. at 782. 
39. 	 See id. 
40. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998); Burlington Indus., 
Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257 (1998). In both cases, the employees were subjected to 
sexual harassment by their supervisors and the employers were not aware of the sexu­
ally offensive behavior. In Ellerth, the company had a policy against sexual harassment, 
which the employee chose not to use. See Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2262. In Faragher, there 
was a written procedure which was never distributed to the employees or supervisors. 
See Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2280-81. In both cases, the Court noted that the employer 
could defend itself by showing that it had exercised reasonable care by implementing a 
policy of which the employee had failed to take advantage. 
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(a) Employment by the insured; or 
(b) Performing duties related to the conduct of the insured's 
business .... 
The term "arising out of" has been given broad interpret a­
tion.41 Courts have applied the exclusion even in situations where 
some of the offending acts occurred outside the employment. For 
example, in Meadowbrook, Inc. v. Tower Insurance Co. ,42 the 
Supreme Court of Minnesota applied the employer's liability exclu­
sion to bar coverage for an employee's injuries reSUlting from a hos­
tile work environment, even though some of the hostile acts 
arguably occurred outside the workplace. The three alleged in­
stances which supported the claim for hostile work environment 
were (1) a remark made during a pre-employment interview; (2) a 
pinch made at a company volleyball game; and (3) telephone calls 
made by a supervisor to the employee at home. The appellate court 
did not apply the exclusion to bar coverage because some of the 
acts allegedly occurred outside of the employment relationship. 
The state supreme court reversed, finding: 
Assuming for the sake of argument that these instances in fact 
occurred outside the scope of the plaintiffs' employment ... the 
injuries allegedly caused by these instances were directly related 
to the creation of a hostile work environment. . .. In assessing 
whether an insurer has a duty to defend, the court must focus on 
the claim and whether its elements fit within the exclusion. . .. In 
this case, the court of appeals mistakenly focused on some of the 
conduct being asserted to prove the claim. The claim asserted 
that the environment in which the plaintiffs worked had become 
hostile. It is incongruous to hold that such a claim can arise any­
where but in the course and scope of a plaintiff's employment.43 
In St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Seagate Technology, 
41. See, e.g., New England Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 667 N.E.2d 
295, 298 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996) (finding that exclusion which bars coverage for personal 
injury arising out of discrimination also bars coverage for discrimination and common 
law torts of negligent misrepresentation, negligence, and loss of consortium; term "aris­
ing out of' is synonymous with "originate" or "come into being"); see also American 
Motorists Ins. Co. v. L-C-A Sales Co., 713 A.2d 1007, 1010 (N.J. 1998) (construing the 
term "arising out of' broadly to mean "originating from" or "growing out of'). But see 
Kimmins Indus. Servo Corp. V. Reliance Ins. Co., 19 F.3d 78, 82 (2d Cir. 1993) (noting 
that although the term "arising out of' is broadly construed, in the context of an exclu­
sion, the "injury does not arise out of a specified set of conditions unless it is proxi­
mately caused by those conditions"). 
42. 559 N.W.2d 411 (Minn. 1997). 
43. Id. at 420 (citations omitted). 
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Inc.,44 the Minnesota Appellate Court applied the exclusion to bar 
coverage for claims against Seagate for failure to provide its em­
ployee with a safe workplace. In this case two employees, Christian 
and Lipscomb, began a personal relationship in December 1992. In 
May 1993, Christian was assaulted by Lipscomb at their home and, 
thereafter, obtained an order for protection against him. Christian 
forwarded the order to Lipscomb, to her employer's human re­
sources department, and to her supervisor, and further requested 
their assistance in enforcing the order. Lipscomb, however, contin­
ued to harass and intimidate Christian. When she complained to 
her supervisor she was told to look for another job, because Lips­
comb had more job seniority. On May 20, 1993, Lipscomb as­
saulted Christian at her work station.45 
The court, in concluding that the employer liability exclusion in 
the CGL policy barred coverage for Christian's claim against her 
employer, held: 
It is undisputed the conditions of Christian's employment pro­
vided the time and place for the assault. Moreover, Lipscomb's 
access to Christian at her workstation and Seagate's failure to 
investigate or take steps to stop Lipscomb's harassment of Chris­
tian increased the risk of Christian being assaulted by Lipscomb. 
Under these circumstances, Christian's claims fit within the em­
ployer's liability exclusion.46 
These cases provide examples of how courts will look to the 
nature of the claim to determine whether the employers' liability 
exclusion will be applied to bar coverage. If it is an employment­
related claim, the exclusion will likely be applied even when the 
alleged wrongdoing may have occurred outside the employment 
premises.47 
44. 570 N.W.2d 503 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997). 
45. See id. at 505. 
46. Id. at 507. 
47. See American Motorists Ins. Co. v. L·C-A Sales Co., 713 A.2d 1007 (N.J. 
1998) (upholding the exclusion to bar coverage for wrongful termination claims based 
on claimant's age, and rejecting the employer's argument that the exclusion did not 
apply because, if anything, the "bodily injury" occurred after the termination); Board of 
Educ. v. Continental Ins. Co., 198 A.D.2d 816 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) (finding that em­
ployer liability exclusion applied to bar coverage for teacher's claim of sexual harass­
ment and hostile work environment even though principal committed some of the 
alleged acts of sexual harassment away from school); Ottumwa Hous. Auth. v. State 
Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 495 N.W.2d 723, 727 (Iowa 1993) (noting that the exclusion 
applies regardless of whether the employer has any liability under workers' compensa­
tion; all that is required is that the injury arise out of and in the course of employment). 
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B. Coverage B: Personal and Advertising Injury Liability 
The CGL policy also provides coverage for employment-re­
lated claims due to a violation of an enumerated offense found 
under the definition of "personal injury." Coverage B insures 
claims for "personal injury," which includes injury, other than 
"bodily injury," arising out of one or more of the following enumer­
ated offenses: 
a. False arrest, detention, or imprisonment; 
b. Malicious prosecution; 
c. The wrongful eviction from, wrongful entry into, or inva­
sion of the right of private occupancy of a room, dwelling, or 
premises that a person occupies by or on behalf of its owner, 
landlord, or lessor; 
d. Oral or written publication of material that slanders or 
libels a person or organization or disparages a person's or organi­
zation's goods, products, or services; or 
e. Oral or written publication of material that violates a per­
son's right of privacy. 
Unlike Coverage A, Coverage B has no "occurrence" require­
ment. As such, there is coverage for employment-related claims 
when the complaint asserts a claim for one of the enumerated of­
fenses.48 In most instances, where the claim does not specifically 
assert an enumerated offense, courts will not find coverage under 
Coverage B.49 In some instances, courts have found coverage 
48. See, e.g., Zurich Ins. Co. v. Smart & Fmal Inc., 996 F. Supp. 979 (CD. Cal. 
1998) (concluding that false imprisonment is covered); Melugin v. Zurich Canada, 57 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 781, 783-84 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (pointing out that the policy's definition 
of personal injury was extended to include "discrimination ... where insurance against 
same was not prohibited by law." The court found coverage under the policy for a 
claim of disparate impact discrimination since coverage for such discrimination was not 
prohibited by law). 
49. See, e.g., Hamlin v. Western Mut. Ins. Co., 461 N.W.2d 395 (Ct. App. Minn. 
1990) (finding that a claim for sexual harassment did not fall within "personal injury" 
definition); Ottumwa Hous. Auth., 495 N.W.2d at 728 (concluding that allegations that 
plaintiffs were subjected to verbal abuse, sexually suggestive conversation, insults, and 
unwanted sexual innuendoes did not trigger coverage under personal injury, since com­
plaint did not seek damages for plaintiffs' reputation); Kilgore v. Resumix, Inc., Mea­
ley's Emerging Disputes, Vol. 3, Issue #5, at A-1 (Mass. Super. Ct. Apr. 16, 1998) 
(finding that deposition testimony by Kilgore, that he suspected that Resumix had de­
famed him and damaged his reputation because people no longer will to do business 
with him, was insufficient to trigger coverage for libel under definition of personal in­
jury; "Kilgore failed, in the deposition, to allude to specific instances of possible defa­
mation, and he was not able to recount any statements, whether defamatory or not, that 
were related to him or to his work"). 
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under "personal injury" when there is no cause of action for an 
enumerated offense but the facts alleged in the underlying com­
plaint could potentially support a claim for one of the enumerated 
offenses. 
In Duff Supply Co. v. Crum & Forster Insurance Co. ,50 the 
court found coverage and a duty to defend because the facts alleged 
a potential claim for defamation. The complaint asserted claims for 
gender-based discrimination and sexual harassment, but did not as­
sert a cause of action for defamation. However, in the context of 
the claim for sexually hostile work environment, the complaint al­
leged that the plaintiff endured comments about her clothing, e.g., 
"when plaintiff wore high heels they were referred to as 'f-k me 
pumps.' "51 The court found that these allegations constituted a 
"publication" for purposes of supporting a defamation claim: 
Although this paragraph does not explicitly state that these com­
ments were made to other employees in the office, this paragraph 
implicitly alleges that the statements were made by and in the 
presence of various employees at McLean's [complainant] place 
of work. Thus, McLean asserted the requisite 'publication' in her 
Complaint.52 
Since the allegations could be read to include a claim for defama­
tion, the court held that there was coverage and a duty to defend 
under the policy.53 
C. The Co-Employee Exclusion to Coverage A and Coverage B 
The "Who Is An Insured" section of the COL policy generally 
provides that employees are insured under the employers' COL 
policy for acts performed within the course and scope of employ­
ment. Oftentimes this same provision will go on to include what is 
referred to as the "fellow employee exclusion," which bars coverage 
to employees for "bodily injury" or "personal injury" to a co-em­
ployee. If an employee is sued, the question becomes whether his 
or her alleged wrongful conduct was in the course and scope of the 
employment and, if so, whether the covered "bodily injury" or 
"personal injury" was to a co-employee. 
50. No. CIV.A. 96-8481, 1997 WL 255483, at *1 (E.D. Pa. May 8, 1997). 
51. Id. at *6. 
52. Id. 
53. See id. at *6-7; see also Commercial Union Assurance Co. v. Merrill, 6 F. 
Supp. 2d 439 (D.V.I. 1998) (finding that plaintiffs' claim that breach of employment 
claim damaged their reputation was covered under "personal injury"). 
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The CGL policy does not define "course and scope of employ­
ment." Therefore, courts often turn to the common law definition 
to determine whether the employee seeking coverage was acting in 
the course and scope of employment. Newyear v. Church Insurance 
Co. 54 is a good example of how courts do not provide coverage to 
an employee when the alleged offending conduct was not in the 
furtherance of employment. In Newyear, the plaintiff was an Epis­
copal Priest of the Episcopal Diocese of Missouri, who was sued by 
two women who alleged that over the course of several years he 
engaged in sexual misconduct with them during pastoral counsel­
ing.55 Newyear filed a declaratory judgment seeking coverage 
under the CGL policy issued by Church Insurance.56 The policy 
defined insured to include any clergyman and employee acting 
within the course and scope of his duties as such.57 Newyear argued 
that he was entitled to a defense under the policy because the alle­
gations in the underlying complaint against him arose out of his du­
ties as a pastoral counselor.58 He further argued that as "counseling 
relationships tend to give rise to a wide range of intense emotions, 
allegations of sexual contact or innuendo that arise from such coun­
seling are not unforeseeable and are therefore covered under the 
[policy]."59 
The co.urt found that "to determine whether Newyear is an in­
sured under the Policy, we must find not only that the allegations 
arise out of pastoral counseling but that Newyear was also acting 
within his duties as an employee of the Diocese when he engaged in 
the sexual misconduct," otherwise the language in the policy "act­
ing within the scope of their duties as employees ... would be ren­
dered meaningless."6o The court went on to hold that since the 
policy did not define "acting within the scope of his duties," the 
district court was correct to look to Missouri law which requires 
that under agency principles, an act is within the course and scope 
of employment if it is in furtherance of the business or interests of 
the employer.61 The court also noted that under Missouri law "a 
priest does not act in furtherance of the business or interests of his 
54. 155 F.3d 1041 (8th Cir. 1998). 
55. See id. at 1042. 
56. See id. 
57. See id. at 1042-43. 
58. See id. at 1043. 
59. Id. at 1041. 
60. Id. at 1044. 
61. See id. 
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employer when he engages in sexual misconduct with parishio­
ners."62 Applying this reasoning, the court determined that 
Newyear was not entitled to a defense under the policy.63 
1\vo cases decided by the Supreme Court of California, 
although not insurance coverage decisions, may be instructive in de­
fining what is meant by the course and scope of employment in the 
context of a sexual harassment claim, and hence, whether the al­
leged individual wrongdoer can enjoy coverage under the CGL pol­
icy. In the first case, Farmers Insurance Group v. County of Santa 
Clara,64 the court held that sexual harassment of a subordinate cor­
rectional institution employee by a deputy sheriff was not within his 
scope of employment, and thus the employer entity would not have 
any vicarious liability for his actions. The second case, Lisa M. v. 
Henry Mayo Newhall Memorial Hospital,65 did not involve an em­
ployment situation. This was a case regarding the sexual molesta­
tion of a pregnant patient by a hospital ultrasound technician. As 
in Santa Clara, the court found the technician's actions to be 
outside the course and scope of employment because they were not 
motivated by a desire to serve the employer's interests. 
However, even if the employee's act is found to be within the 
scope of employment, the same act may also apply to bar coverage. 
For example, in Miller v. McClure,66 Miller sued her supervisor, 
McClure, and her employer for sexual harassment and discrimina­
tion. The complaint alleged sexually hostile and offensive conduct 
by McClure over the course of her employment. McClure sought 
coverage under three policies: the employer's workers' compensa­
tion/employer liability policy, the employer's CGL policy, and his 
homeowners' policy. In determining whether McClure was insured 
under the CGL policy the court found that: 
[P]laintiff's core allegations that she was the victim of sexual har­
assment constituting sex discrimination ... is dependent on her 
employment by Artex and McClure's position as her supervisor. 
Consequently, McClure is an insured under the policy regarding 
those alleged acts. The same facts, however, remove McClure as 
an insured under that part of the definition of insured providing 
that "no employee is an insured for bodily injury or personal in­
62. Id. at 1044-45. 
63. See id. at 1045. 
64. 906 P.2d 440 (Cal. 1995). 
65. 907 P.2d 358 (Cal. 1995). 
66. A-0315-97T5F and A-1183-97T5f (N.J. App. Div. May 27, 1998) (unpublished 
opinion). 
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jury. . to a co-employee while in the course of his or her 
employment."67 
Therefore, even when the CGL policy is triggered to provide 
coverage for the employer, there is a substantial question as to 
whether the individual employee is also insured under the policy. 
Regardless of whether the employee is the supervisor who commit­
ted the alleged wrongful acts, or the supervisor who failed to act in 
preventing or correcting the ongoing sexual harassment, coverage 
may be denied either because the supervisor is not an insured, i.e., 
his or her acts were not in the scope of employment, or the acts fall 
under the fellow employee exclusion. 
D. 	 The Employment-Related Practices Exclusion to Coverage A 
and Coverage B 
As employment practice claims became more prevalent during 
the 1980's, insurers became concerned about the possibility that 
coverage for employment practices would eventually be found 
under a CGL form. As a result, ISO developed a new endorsement 
(CG 21 47) to eliminate all coverage under a CGL policy for em­
ployment-related injuries, including wrongful employment practices 
involving defamation and invasion of privacy that might otherwise 
be insured under CGL Coverage B.68 
There are a number of decisions that have addressed the appli­
cability of this or similar exclusions. For example, in Frank & 
Freedus v. Allstate Insurance Co. ,69 the firm was sued for, inter alia, 
defamation, based on statements made by a partner about a former 
employee, Martin Caprow. Allegedly, the partner stated that 
Caprow was "likely gay and probably has AIDS."70 The court held 
that the employment-related practices exclusion applied to bar cov­
erage.71 The court reasoned that the defamatory statement was 
clearly employment-related since "[t]he statement was made in the 
context of Caprow's employment and its content is directly related 
67. Id. 
68. The ISO "Employment-Related Practices Exclusion" excludes coverage for 
"bodily injury" or "personal injury" "to: (1) A person arising out of any: (a) Refusal to 
employ that person; (b) Termination of that person's employment; or (c) Employment­
related practices, policies, acts or omissions, such as coercion, demotion, evaluation, 
reassignment, discipline, defamation, harassment, humiliation, or discrimination di­
rected at that person ...." 
69. 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 678 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996). 
70. See id. at 680. 
71. See id. at 685. 
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to Caprow's performance as an employee."72 In contrast, in HS 
Services, Inc. v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. ,73 the court held 
that the employment-related practices exclusion did not bar cover­
age for a defamation claim· when the defamatory statements were 
made three months after the wrongful termination and the state­
ments were made in an attempt to prevent the terminated em­
ployee from competing with the former employer. 
While defamation is specifically referenced under paragraph 
(c) of the exclusion as an employment-related practice, policy, or 
act which is not covered, false arrest, detention, imprisonment and 
invasion of privacy, all covered offenses under the definition of 
"personal injury," were not itemized by the drafters under subpara­
graph (c) of the Employment-Related Practices Exclusion. 
Whether false imprisonment was excluded under paragraph (c), 
also referred to as the "catch all" clause, was addressed in Zurich 
Insurance Co. v. Smart & Final, Inc. 74 
In Zurich Insurance Co., Richard Michener, an employee of 
Smart & Final, was driven by co-employees, without his consent, to 
a motel room where they interrogated him about inventory 
shortages and mistakes he may have committed during his employ­
menU5 During the interrogation, Michener felt coerced and intimi­
dated.76 He was told that Smart & Final would not retaliate.if he 
told the truth.77 Nevertheless, his employment was terminated.78 
Michener then filed an action against Smart & Final for, inter alia, 
false imprisonment. Zurich denied coverage to Smart & Final 
based on the employment-related practices exclusion.79 The court 
held that the exclusion did not bar coverage, and that Zurich had an 
obligation to defend Smart & Final for the entire action.80 The 
court explained that the exclusion did not specifically exclude false 
imprisonment, and that the catch-all phrase "other employment-re­
72. Id.; see also Alexandra House, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 419 
N.W.2d 506, 510 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (finding that employee's claim regarding defam­
atory statements made about her sexual preference was barred by employment-related 
exclusion: "Statements concerning an employee are employment-related where they 
cause an employer to conduct an employment review and result in the employer requir­
ing the employee to take part in counseling"). 
73. 109 F.3d 642 (9th Cir. 1997). 
74. 996 F. Supp. 979 (CD. Cal. 1998). 
75. See id. at 981. 
76. See id. 
77. See id. 
78. See id. 
79. See id. 
80. See id. at 988-89. 
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lated practices, policies, acts or omissions" found in the employ­
ment-related exclusion did not _bar coverage for the false 
imprisonment claim.81 The court reasoned that "one cannot as­
sume causation between the false imprisonment and Michener's ul­
timate suspension and termination; rather, the false imprisonment 
arose solely in the context of loss prevention. "82 
Based on the decisions discussed above, whether the employ­
ment-related practices exclusion bars coverage will turn on the spe­
cific factual allegations within the complaint and causes of action 
asserted. For example, the courts look to such facts as whether the 
wrongdoing against the plaintiff occurred before the termination of 
employment or after, and whether it was committed in the course of 
employment or arose in the employment context. 
E. The Duty to Defend 
Employers also need to be concerned with the issue of whether 
the CGL defense obligation extends to enforcement actions or pro­
ceedings that do not necessarily seek an award of actual money 
damages, such as charges of discrimination brought before the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). These 
proceedings can be arduous, if not costly to handle, and may re­
quire lawyers with special familiarity with various laws, statutes, 
regulations, and procedures. For example, an adverse EEOC prob­
able cause determination may have an impact on the employer's 
future liability. Although not preclusive in any subsequent federal 
action brought by the EEOC or by the aggrieved employee, a prob­
able cause determination may still be admissible evidence against 
the employer.83 
The CGL policy generally provides that the insurer has a duty 
to defend a "suit," which is defined as "a civil proceeding in which 
damages because of 'bodily injury,' 'property damage,' 'personal in­
jury,' or 'advertising injury' to which this insurance applies are al­
leged."84 An EEOC proceeding is not a "suit seeking those 
81. See id. at 988. 
82. Id.; see also Lawson v. Strauss, 673 So. 2d 223, 227 (La. Ct. App. 1996) (hold­
ing that a policy exclusion arising out of "personnel practices, policies, acts or omis­
sions" did not exclude claim by ex-employee for assault and battery). 
83. See Whately v. Skaggs Cos., 707 F.2d 1129, 1136-37 (10th Cir. 1983) (finding 
that admission of EEOC investigator's determination was not reversible error because 
it was not given preclusive effect); Smith v. Universal Servs. Inc., 454 F.2d 154, 158 (5th 
Cir. 1972) (finding of probable cause and EEOC report held admissible under federal 
law). 
84. The definition of "suit" also includes: "a. An arbitration proceeding in which 
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damages" (or any damages) and therefore, the insurer arguably has 
no duty to defend. Oftentimes the Charge of Discrimination will 
not specifically allege a "bodily injury" or "personal injury" offense. 
Rather, it provides a short description of the offending conduct of 
sexual harassment and/or discrimination, without providing the 
type of detail that would be required (claims of physical manifesta­
tions) to trigger coverage for "bodily injury." Even more rare are 
allegations of defamation, invasion of privacy, or false imprison­
ment, which are covered offenses under the definition of "personal 
injury." Moreover, the EEOC proceeding cannot impose damages 
against the employer as contemplated under t4e CGL policy. The 
EEOC proceeding is a conciliation proceeding. As one court 
pointed out: ' 
[T]he duty to defend is triggered when the insured is involved in 
an adversarial proceeding, a consequence of which is the factual 
determination that legal liability mayor may not be imposed 
upon the insured. It matters not whether the factual determina­
tion is made by a judicial body after the filing of a complaint and 
a plenary hearing, or whether the determination is made by an 
administrative body which has the authority to impose liability 
upon the insured. It is not the forum in which the proceeding is 
held that is critical, but whether, as a result of the hearing, liabil­
ity may be imposed.85 
Since the EEOC proceeding cannot impose liability upon the em­
ployer, arguably there should be no duty to defend an insured in 
such a proceeding.86 
II. HOMEOWNERS' POLICIES 
Particularly in sexual harassment cases, the aggrieved em­
ployee will often sue both the employer and the employee who 
such damages are claimed and to which the insured must submit or does submit with 
our consent; or b. Any other alternative dispute resolution proceeding in which such 
damages are claimed and to which the insured submits with our consent." 
85. Campbell Soup Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 571 A.2d 1013, 1017-18 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1988), affd, 571 A.2d 969 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990). 
86. See Solo Cup Co. v. Federal Ins. Co., 619 F.2d 1178 (7th Cir. 1980) (finding 
that insurer did not breach its duty to defend a General Services Administration pro­
ceeding because these proceedings are conciliatory in nature and cannot impose liabil­
ity upon the insured). But see School Dist. No.1, Multnomah County v. Mission Ins. 
Co., 650 P.2d 936 (Or. Ct. App. 1982) (holding that insurer had an obligation to defend 
its insured in a proceeding before the EEOC and the state Bureau of Labor because the 
term suit was ambiguous and the state statute gave the BOL commissioner power to 
order the District to compensate its victims). 
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committed the harassment, as well as the employees who failed to 
prevent or correct the hostile environment. The defendant employ­
ees will often seek coverage under their personal homeowners' pol­
icy. Each homeowners' policy must be reviewed to determine 
whether it provides coverage for EPL claims. Generally, home­
owners' policies provide coverage for "bodily injury" and "property 
damage" caused by an accident or occurrence; sometimes they pro­
vide coverage for "personal injury" offenses such as defamation or 
invasion of privacy. Therefore, like the CGL policy discussed 
above, the homeowners' policy would require that the complainant 
assert a claim for "bodily injury," i.e., in most jurisdictions a claim 
for physical injury resulting from an accident.87 
Assuming the complainant asserts a claim for "bodily injury" 
caused by an accident, homeowners' policies often provide perti­
nent exclusions such as the "intentional acts" and "business pur­
suits" exclusions which may bar coverage to the individual 
employee.88 The "business pursuit" exclusion is intended to apply 
to activities that are involved in the furtherance of one's business, 
employment, trade, occupation, or profession. It has been held that 
in order to constitute a business, two elements must be present: (i) 
continuity and (ii) profit motive.89 As such, where the alleged con­
duct can be construed as personal in nature, the business pursuit 
exclusion may not apply to bar coverage.90 Where the individual 
employee seeking coverage under the homeowners' policy is the 
harasser who created the alleged hostile environment, courts will 
probably apply the intentional acts exclusion to bar coverage. 
However, where the individual employee is being sued because he 
or she failed as a supervisor to stop or correct the harassing envi­
87. See supra pages 3-6. 
88. There are many variations of the intentional acts exclusion found in home­
owners' policies. For example, the exclusion could read: "this insurance does not apply 
to 'bodily injury' or 'property damage' expected or intended from the standpoint of the 
insured" or "bodily injury, property damage, or personal injury arising out of the inten­
tional acts of any insured." Similarly, the business pursuit exclusion will vary from pol­
icy to policy. In essence, the exclusion will bar coverage for bodily injury, property 
damage, personal injury or loss which arises out of, results from, or is caused by the 
insured's business pursuits. The policy will often define "business" to include trade, 
profession or employment. 
89. See United Food Serv., Inc. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 189 A.D.2d 74 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 1993); Shapiro v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 47 A.D.2d 856 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975). 
90. See, e.g., Scheer v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 708 So. 2d 312 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1998) (finding that allegations that insured touched co-employee's breast and but­
tocks and made sexually offensive remarks are not in furtherance of business interest 
and, therefore, business pursuit exclusion did not apply). 
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ronment, the busine"ss pursuit exclusion most likely bars coverage.91 
For example, in Miller v. McClure,92 Suzanne Miller sued both 
her employer, Artex Knitting Mills, Inc., and John McClure, in his 
individual capacity and as a supervising employee at Artex. The 
complaint alleged egregious behavior by McClure for acts in the 
course of his employment as a supervisor and for acts done in his 
personal capacity. The court concluded that there was no coverage 
for McClure under his homeowners' policy because the business 
pursuit exclusion barred coverage for his alleged acts as a supervi­
sor. As for the acts in his personal capacity, specifically the offen­
sive touching, the intentional acts exclusion barred coverage. 
HI. UMBRELLA LIABILITY POLICIES 
As there is no standard umbrella policy, each umbrella policy 
must be reviewed individually to determine whether it may cover 
EPL claims. Umbrella policies generally provide broader coverage 
than the underlying primary policies on top of which they sit. In 
fact, it is not unusual for an umbrella policy to cover a claim for 
which there is no coverage under the underlying primary policy. 
For example, in Interco Inc. v. Mission Insurance Co. ,93 the primary 
COL policy did not provide coverage for an employment termina­
tion claim because of an employer liability exclusion. The umbrella 
policy, however, defined an "occurrence" as an "accident or a hap­
pening or event ... which unexpectedly and unintentionally results 
in personal ~njury."94 The court concluded that the definition of 
occurrence excluded coverage only for intentional acts, and the in­
jury or damage is intentional only if there is specific intent to cause 
the harm or the insured's intent to harm is inferred as a matter of 
law.95 The court concluded that the firing of an employee could 
potentially be covered if there is no showing of specific intent to 
cause the physical and emotional damages sustained by the em­
ployee, and therefore the carrier should have assumed the de­
fense.96 Although umbrella policies are by their nature quite 
broad, there is nevertheless a growing trend for umbrella insurers 
to incorporate employment practices exclusions into their policies. 
91. See United Food Serv., Inc., 189 A.D.2d at 74; Shapiro, 47 A.D.2d at 856. 
92. A-0315-97T5F and A-1183-97T5F (N.J. App. Div. May 27, 1998) (unpub­
lished opinion). See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
93. 808 F.2d 682 (8th Cir. 1987). 
94. Id. at 685. 
95. See id. at 685-86. 
96. See id. at 686. 
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IV. WORKERS' COMPENSATION LIABILITY POLICIES 
Like the CGLpolicy, the Workers' Compensation ("WC") pol­
icy provides two coverage parts: "Part One-Workers' Compensa­
tion" and "Part Two-Employers' Liability." Both parts require 
the employee to sustain a bodily injury by accident or disease 
within the course and scope of his or her employment with the in­
sured. Part One, however, provides coverage to the employer for 
its obligation to pay the benefits it is required to pay an employee 
under the state's specified workers' compensation law.97 Part Two, 
in contrast, provides coverage for the employer's obligation to pay 
damages for the bodily injury caused by accident or disease. 
Courts have generally agreed that there is no coverage under 
Part One for civil damages sought by an employee for employment 
liability claims such as harassment, discrimination, and wrongful 
termination. For example, in HDH Corp. v. Atlantic Charter Insur­
ance Co., 98 the court held that "[ t ]he terms of Part One of the pol­
icy clearly limit defense and indemnity of the employer to claims for 
benefits required by the workers' compensation statute."99 Simi­
larly, in La lolla Beach & Tennis Club, Inc. v. Industrial Indemnity 
Co. ,100 the court held that "the civil and workers' compensation ... 
insurer which promises to pay claims for benefits does not have a 
duty to defend civil actions seeking damages. "101 
Courts have recognized that Part Two of the WC policy is in­
tended to provide protection for those situations where the insured 
employer is not subject to workers' compensation law or where the 
employee has a right to bring a common law tort action despite the 
provision of workers' compensation law.102 As such, coverage for 
certain types of employment practice claims may be available under 
Part Two of the standard WC policy. However, as with the CGL, 
workers' compensation insurers have been incorporating exclusions 
for employment practice claims into the body of their policies or 
adding the same by endorsement. An example of such an exclusion 
97. Generally, the declaration page of the WC policy will indicate for which state 
workers' compensation law coverage is being provided. 
98. 681 N.E.2d 847 (Mass. 1997). 
99. Id. at 850. 
100. 884 P.2d 1048 (Cal. 1994). 
101. Id. at 1059. 
102. See, e.g., Schmidt v. Smith, 713 A.2d 1014, 1016 (N.J. 1998); Michaelian v. 
State Compensation Ins. Fund, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 133, 137 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996); Conrad v. 
Mike Anderson Seafood, Inc., CIV.A.NO. 89-1481, 1991 WL 22925, at *6 (E.D. La. 
Feb. 15, 1991). 
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can be found in the Employer's Liability ("EL") part of the ~tan­
dard WC policy distributed by the National Council on Compensa­
tion Insurance ("NCCI"), which provides, "[t]his insurance does 
not cover . . . damages arising out of coercion, criticism, demotion, 
evaluation, reassignment, discipline, defamation, harassment, hu­
miliation, discrimination against or termination of any employee, or 
any personnel practices, policies, acts or omissions." 
Based upon the previously stated standard exclusion, coverage 
is likely prohibited under Part Tho of the WC policy for a wrongful 
employment practice claim. For example, in Michaelian v. State 
Compensation Insurance Fund,103 the insured sought coverage 
under Part Two of its WC policy for a suit brought by a former 
employee alleging sexual harassment, constructive discharge result­
ing from the harassment, assault and battery, and negligent inflic­
tion of emotional distress.104 The court found that the provision in 
Part Two of the policy which excluded "damages arising out of the 
discharge of, coercion of or discrimination against any employee in 
violation of law" applied, and barred coverage for the claims of har­
assment and constructive discharge. lOS As for the claims of assault 
and battery, coverage was excluded by Part Tho's exclusion for 
"bodily injury intentionally caused or aggravated by you ...."106 
Finally, the court denied coverage for the cause of action for negli­
gent infliction of emotional distress because none of the facts al­
leged in the underlying complaint gave rise to any conceivable 
theory bringing the claim within the policy's coverage.107 
However, in Schmidt v. Smith,108 the New Jersey Supreme 
Court held that a similar exclusion found in Part Tho of a WC pol­
icy was in violation of New Jersey law.109 In Schmidt, Lisa Schmidt 
filed suit against her employer, Personalized Audio Visual, Inc. 
("PAV") and the president of PAY, Dennis Smith.11° The com­
plaint asserted hostile work environment, sexual harassment in vio­
lation of New Jersey's Law Against Discrimination, assault, battery, 
invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional dis­
tress.111 PAY sought coverage under both its COL and WC policies 
103. 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 133 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996). 
104. See id. at 137-38. 
105. See id. at 141. 
106. Id. 
107. See id. at 142. 
108. 713 A.2d 1014 (N.J. 1998). 
109. See id. at 1015. 
110. See id. 
111. See id. at 1016. 
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issued by its insurer, United States Fidelity & Guaranty 
("USF&G").112 USF&G denied coverage under both policies, rely­
ing on two exclusions found in the EL part of the policy.113 First, it 
asserted the application of the employer related practices exclusion 
similar to the one quoted above.114 Second, it relied upon an exclu­
sion which bars coverage for "bodily injury intentionally caused or 
aggravated by yoU."115 
Before addressing the application of coverage under the EL 
part of the WC policy, the court noted that the New Jersey Legisla­
ture requires that every employer carry workers' compensation in­
surance, stating that "[t]hose policies must cover not only claims for 
compensation prosecuted in the Workers' Compensation court, but 
also claims for work-related injuries asserted in a common law 
court."116 The court also noted that EL coverage "is traditionally 
written in conjunction with workers' compensation and is intended 
to serve as a 'gap-filler' providing protection to the employer in 
those situations where the employee has a right to bring a tort ac­
tion despite provisions of the workers' compensation statute."117 
The court held that the intentional acts exclusion did not bar 
coverage because there was no evidence that PAY intentionally 
caused any injury to Ms. Schmidt.lls With respect to the employ­
ment-related exclusion, the court stated: 
The employers' liability section of the contract was to provide 
compensation for bodily injuries to workers falling outside the 
workers' compensation system--injuries intentionally caused by 
fellow employees, for example, or injuries befalling a worker 
under the age of eighteen "by reason of the negligence of his or 
her master." Exclusion C7 [the employment-related exclusion] 
in the employers' liability section disclaims coverage for a class of 
discomforts that one typically would not associate with bodily in­
jury-- criticism, demotion, evaluation, and defamation, for exam­
ple--and that one typically would not expect to be covered by a 
112. See id. 
113. See id. 




118. See id. at 1018. Interestingly, PAY was a closely held corporation; the of­
fender, Dennis Smith, was the president of PAY; and his father was the CEO and a 
part-time employee. Although the court did not expressly impute Dennis Smith's acts 
upon the company, it held that the company was vicariously liable for Dennis Smith's 
acts. 
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scheme designed to insure that employees' bodily injuries be 
compensated.119 
The court held that the exclusion is valid as long as the liability 
arising from those discomforts is not related to bodily injury.l20 
However, to the extent that the exclusion would otherwise operate 
to deny coverage for bodily injuries, it violates public policy under 
the New Jersey workers' compensation scheme, and is thus void.121 
The Schmidt decision raises a number of questions. First, the 
court held that "bodily injury" within the we policies were "emo­
tional injuries accompanied by physical manifestations" pursuant to 
its prior decision in Voorhees v. Preferred Mutual Insurance CO.122 
However, in Voorhees, the court interpreted "bodily injury" as spe­
cifically defined in a eGL policy, not "bodily injury" within the 
context of a we policy, which does not usually define the term.123 
Second, the court held that the exclusion should be applied only in 
the context where there are no allegations of "bodily injury." Yet, 
if the complaint does not allege bodily injury, the insurer arguably 
has no obligation to defend. The Voorhees court stated that the 
"duty to defend . . . is determined by whether a covered claim is 
made ...."124 If the complaint does not allege a "bodily injury" in 
the course of employment, there is no allegation of a covered claim 
under the policy, and therefore, no duty to defend. 
The Schmidt court failed to address two additional arguments. 
First, we policies generally require that the bodily injury be by ac­
cident or disease. Yet, the insurer seemingly did not raise the argu­
ment that Ms. Schmidt's injuries resulting from sexual harassment 
and/or assault and battery could not be caused by accident or dis­
ease. Secondly, we policies generally provide coverage only for 
the employer. However, in Schmidt, the court arguably held that 
there was coverage for both PAY and Smith. While one could con­
clude that the requirement that the bodily injury occur by accident 
violates New Jersey's workers' compensation scheme, in the ab­
sence of any guidance, one could also argue that employees are not 
covered under the we policies.125 
119. Id. (citations omitted). 
120. See id. 
121. See id. 
122. 607 A.2d 1255 (N.J. 1992). 

123~ See id. at 1261-62. 

124. Id. at 1259. 
125. See, e.g., Miller v. McClure, A-0315-97T5F and A-1183-97T5F (N.J. App. 
Div. May 27, 1998) (unpublished opinion). McClure was denied coverage under the 
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V. DIRECTORS' AND OFFICERS' LIABILITY POLICIES 
Unlike the COL and we policy, there is no standard Direc­
tors' and Officers~ Liability ("D&O") policy form.126 Under a typi­
cal D&O policy, a corporation's directors and officers are covered 
for wrongful acts committed in their capacities as such, and the cor­
poration is reimbursed for indemnifying them. It should be noted 
that D&O policies "vary from insurer to insurer and in many in­
stances these variations are significant and materiaL'., .."127 Most 
claims against directors and officers are brought by the corpora­
tion's shareholders and commonly involve securities disputes. An 
increasing number of claims, however, are being made by employ­
ees of the corporation. Since most D&O policies exclude claims for 
personal injury or bodily injury, there is no coverage for wrongful 
employment practices to the extent those claims are premised on 
bodily or personal injury allegations. 
Many wrongful employment practices claims rarely provide a 
legitimate basis for claims against directors, since directors do not 
have the type of day-to-day responsibility over the operations of the 
company's business that would subject them to personal liability. 
Likewise, many of these claims are not likely to involve officers, 
particularly in a large corporate organization. However, officers 
may be targets of these claims in smaller organizat~Qns where they 
have more direct involvement in hiring and firing decisions, or 
where claims are premised upon negligence, because the employer 
permitted a pattern of discrimination or sexual harassment to exist 
within the company. ' 
Of course, particularly egregious and expensive underlying sex­
ual harassment and discrimination problems may well give rise to 
shareholder derivative litigation, such as the situation involving Del 
employer's WC policy issued by New Jersey Re-Insurance Company because he was 
not an insured thereunder. As in most WC policies, the policy defined an insured as 
"an employer named in item one of the information page. If that employer is a partner­
ship and if you are one of its partners, you are insured, but only in your capacity as an 
employer of the partnership's employees." The court concluded that McClure was not 
an insured under the policy since there was nothing in the record to indicate that the 
employer was anything but a corporation and, even if it were a partnership, that Mc­
Clure was a partner. 
126. See JOSEPH P. MONTELEONE, Directors' and Officers' Liability Insurance: 
Timing of Payment of Defense Expenses, and Allocation of Defense Expenses, Settle­
ment, and Judgment Amounts, 535 DIREGrORS' AND OFFICERS' LIAB. INs. 263 (Practic­
ing Law Institute Course Handbook 1990). 
127. Id. at 263-64. 
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Laboratories and its CEO, Dan. K. Wassong.128 As a recent exam­
ple, an award of $1 million in attorney fees and costs was approved 
in derivative litigation against Texaco directors arising from that 
company's $176 million racial discrimination class action settlement 
with Texaco employees. As a Delaware corporation, the $1 million 
award was not indemnifiable by Texaco and was borne by the direc­
tors with reimbursement from Texaco's D&O insurance.129 
Even if the claim is asserted against an officer, the question as 
to whether that individual is sued in his or her capacity as an officer 
often arises. Most D&O policies limit their coverage solely to suits 
against directors and officers in their official capacities. Although a 
duty to defend and not an insurance coverage case, Tichenor v. Ro­
man Catholic Church ofArchdiocese ofNew Orleans130 highlighted 
the insured capacity issue. While most of the opinion dealt with the 
issue of personal jurisdiction over an archdiocese and parish which 
employed a priest accused both civilly and criminally of homosex­
ual relations with a minor, the court's analysis was also applied to 
deny any defense obligation on the part of the archdiocese's 
insurer.131 
The Fifth Circuit held that the lower court could not exercise 
personal jurisdiction over a Louisiana archdiocese and parish in an 
action brought in Mississippi arising from acts which took place at 
one of their "employed" priest's home in Mississippi.132 Although 
this case is arguably sui generis because of the nature of a priest's 
employment relationship with his diocese and parish, it raises some 
interesting issues that must be considered in any employment-re­
lated claim vis-a-vis both liability and insurance. 
First, the fact that the illicit acts occurred in the priest's private 
residence while not "on duty" was dispositive as to the issues in­
volving personal jurisdiction over the diocese and parish, as well as 
128. See Del Laboratories, Inc.: Holder's Suit Says Officials Liable in Harassment 
Case, WALL ST. J., Aug. 16, 1995, at A5 (reporting that such a derivative action had 
been filed subsequent to a $1.2 million settlement of sexual harassment claims brought 
by the EEOC on behalf of fifteen female employees of Del Laboratories). 
129. See In Re Texaco, Inc. Shareholder Litigation, 20 F. Supp. 2d 577, 582-83, 
596 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). This decision was subsequently reversed by the Second Circuit, 
which found that substantial benefits were not conferred upon Texaco through the ef­
forts of plaintiff's counsel, and therefore attorney's fees were not justified. See Kaplan 
v. Rand, No. 98-9377, 1999 WL 710382, at "'14 (2d Cir. Sept. 14, 1999). 
130. 32 F.3d 953 (5th Cir. 1994). 
131. See id. at 963-64. 
132. See id. at 960. 
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the diocese's insurer's obligation to defend the priest.133 Second, 
the abhorrent nature of the priest's conduct took his conduct 
outside the scope of his employment.134 While it may be argued 
that the religious and moral missions of the diocese and parish were 
of particular pertinence to this finding, the court's rationale could 
also be applied, as an example, to allegations of sexual harassment 
and/or discrimination in the workplace. To wit, one can argue 
whether it is ever within the scope of one's employment to sexually 
harass employees or discriminate against minority employees. 
In State v Schallock,135 the Arizona court explored this propo­
sition. The principal issue decided was whether a state agency, the 
Arizona Prosecuting Attorney's Advisory Council ("APAAC"), 
had an indemnification obligation to its subordinate director, 
Heinze, for damages resulting from his sexual harassment of 
subordinate female state employees.136 APAAC's own liability for 
creating or tolerating a hostile work environment was not at is­
sue.137 Under an applicable state self-insured statute, Heinze would 
only be indemnified for conduct in the course and scope of his em­
ployment. The court found that the conduct at issue, which ranged 
from offensive and obscene language and sexually offensive touch­
ing, and in one instance, rape, was certainly sufficient to take such 
conduct outside the course and scope of employment.138 Accord­
ingly, the court held that Heinze was not entitled to 
indemnification.139 
In the court's analysis of applicable Arizona law, it determined 
that an employee's acts occur within the course and scope of em­
ployment only if: (i) it is of the kind he or she is employed to per­
form, (ii) it occurs substantially within authorized time and space 
limits; and (iii) it is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve 
the master/employer.14o Given this tripartite test, it is arguable that 
one employee's sexual harassment of another can never be within 
the scope of employment. 
Aside from issues of course and scope of employment, a 
number of federal appellate courts have held that there can be no 
133. See id. at 958-61. 
134. See id. at 959. 
135. 914 P.2d 1306 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995), vacated, 941 P.2d 1275 (Ariz. 1997). 
136. See id. at 1307. 
137. See id. 
138. See id. 
139. See id. at 1311. 
140. See id. at 1310. 
278· WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21:249 
liability on the part of an individual manager, supervisor, or em­
ployer for discrimination under Title VII.141 The liability imposed 
would attach solely to the "employer" itself and not any of its 
agents. Recently, the Supreme Court of California held that there 
could be no individual liability for a discrimination claim under the 
California Fair Employment and Housing Act ("FEHA").142 
The D&O policy, as a "claims made" policy, also presents is­
sues as to when a claim is first deemed to have been made in vari­
ous employment-related situations.143 The issue is particularly 
troublesome if the policy at issue does not precisely define the term 
"claim" or does not provide a definition as to when a claim is 
deemed to have been first made. Some policies are very specific in 
this regard.144 When policies are silent or less precise, however, 
problems arise. For example, in National Union Fire Insurance Co. 
v. Cary Community Consolidated School District No. 26,145 the is­
sue arose as to whether an EEOC charge of age discrimination was 
covered under any of two successive claims-made "school leaders" 
D&O policies.146 
The first policy was a National Union policy scheduled to run 
from July 1, 1988 to July 1, 1991, but which was canceled effective 
141. See e.g., Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1313 (2d Cir. 1995); Grant v. 
Lone Star Co., 21 F.3d 649, 653 (5th Cir. 1994); Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l Inc., 991 F.2d 
583,587-88 (9th Cir. 1993). Similar results have occurred in the context of other federal 
employment discrimination statutes; see EEOC v. AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd., 55 F.3d 
1276, 1279 (7th Cir. 1995) (finding no individual liability in an employment-related 
Americans with Disabilities Act claim); Smith v. Lomax, 45 F.3d 402, 407-08 (11th Cir. 
1995) (finding that individual supervisors are not personally liable under the Age Dis­
crimination in Employment Act). 
142. See Reno v. Baird, 957 P. 2d 1333 (Cal. 1998). In Reno, the underlying case 
involved discrimination based upon a medical condition. The court limited its holding 
to discrimination claims and declined to extend it to claims of harassment. See id. at 
1347 (emphasis added). See supra note 123 for the proposition that none of the federal 
decisions draw a distinction between harassment and other forms of protected 
discrimination. 
143. CGL and WC policies, discussed above, are generally issued on an "occur­
rence" basis, although, one can purchase on a "claims-made" basis. The ISO CGL 
"claim made" form does not define the term "claim." 
144. For example, some Reliance Insurance Co. D&O policies define "claim" as: 
(a) a judicial or other proceeding that is filed against a Director and/or Officer 
and in which such Director and/or Officer could be subject to a binding adjudi­
cation of liability for compensatory money damages or other civil relief, or (b) 
a written demand from one or more parties alleging that such Director and/or 
Officer should have liability to such parties for compensatory money damages 
. or other civil relief. 
145. No. 93-C-6526, 1995 WL 66303, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 14, 1995). 
146. See id. at *1. 
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July 1, 1990.147 It was replaced by a Scottsdale Insurance Company 
policy effective July 1, 1990.148 The underlying factual chronology is 
as follows: 
June 22, 1990: Underlying claimant teacher makes complaint of 
age discrimination to EEOC. 
June 25, 1990: EEOC mails Notice of Charge of Discrimination 
to insured school district, but the charge is non­
specific as to which employee is filing the charge 
and specifically advises that "[nlo action is 
required on your part at this time." 
June 27, 1990: Insured receives the June 25 Notice. 
June 28, 1990: Insured sends Notice and cover letter to its bro­
ker. 
July 9, 1990: Insured receives a second Notice from the 
EEOC. This notice contains a copy of the 
charge dated and signed by the claimant teacher 
as of July 2, 1990.149 
Notice of the matter (which ultimately proceeded into suit on 
October 1, 1990) was initially given to National Union sometime 
after July 1, 1990, but the court's opinion is not specific as to when 
this occurred.150 National Union began to provide a defense be­
cause its personnel were unaware that the policy was canceled ef­
fective July 1, 1990.151 Realizing their error, National Union, and 
perhaps the insured as well, appears to have tendered the defense 
of the suit to Scottsdale.152 Upon Scottsdale's refusal to defend on 
the basis that this was a claim made before the inception of its pol­
icy, coverage litigation ensued.153 The court noted that the Scotts­
dale policy did not contain its own definition of "claim," and 
essentially adopted the common definition of claim, "a demand for 
money or property as of right. "154 
In particular, the court relied upon Bensalem Township v. 
Western World Insurance Co. ,155 which held that an EEOC charge 
of discrimination did not constitute a claim in the context of a 
147. See id. at *2. 
148. See id. 
149. See id. 
150. See id. 
151. See id. at *1. 
152. See id. at *3. 
153. See id. 
154. Id. 
155. 609 F. Supp. 1343 (E.D. Pa. 1985). 
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claims-made policy.156 Holding that the claim here was first made 
after July 1, 1990, the court noted that the June 25, 1990, EEOC 
Notice contained no specific charge document and also contained 
the above-quoted 'no action' language.157 It was further noted that 
the underlying claimant continued to be employed until December 
1990, and thus had no claim for money damages, which the EEOC 
did not have the power to award.15s Scottsdale also argued that 
even if the claim was first made during its policy period, it was ex­
cluded from coverage by virtue of a policy exclusion. The exclusion 
provided that the insurer had no obligation to make payment on or 
defend any claim "arising from any circumstance(s) or incident(s) 
which might give rise to a claim hereunder, which is known to the 
Insured prior to the inception of the policy and not disclosed to the 
Company prior to inception ...."159 The court noted that the ap­
plication for the Scottsdale policy was dated May 8, 1990, and the 
so-called warranty question as to "knowledge of any act, error, 
omission, or breach of duty which may reasonably give rise to a 
claim" was answered in the negative.160 The application did not 
provide for any continuing obligation to disclose information, such 
as an EEOC Notice, up to the time of the policy's inception.161 The 
court stated "[i]t would be unreasonable to impose such an obliga­
tion on an insured without [giving] advance notice of specific con­
tract language so requiring."162 Accordingly, the court held that the 
exclusion was inapplicable to the EEOC Notice received by the in­
sured after the date of the application but prior to the policy incep­
tion date.163 
One of the earliest and still common alternatives to an in­
dependent EPL policy is an extension to a D&O policy. Such ex­
tensions are available for relatively little, if any, additional premium 
for an otherwise desirable D&O risk. However, these D&O exten­
sions have some rather serious shortcomings. While there are some 
broad EPLextensions to the D&O policy in the marketplace, EPL 
156. See id. at 1348-49. 
157. See National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Cary Community Conso!. Sch. Dist. No. 
26, NO. 93-C-6526, 1995 WL 66303, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 14, 1995). 
158. See id. Money damages were not recoverable in civil suits prior to the imple­
mentation of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. See id. 
159. Id. (emphasis added). 
160. See id. at *5. 
161. See id. 
162. Id. at *6. 
163. See id. 
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extensions often contain one or more of the following policy 
restrictions: 
• 	no coverage for the insured entity; 
• 	no coverage for non-officer employees; 
• 	exclusion of coverage pursuant to the insured versus insured 
exclusion, for employment practices claims brought by officers 
against other officers and directors;l64 and 
• 	exclusion of coverage for emotional distress and mental 
anguish, typically pursuant to the bodily injury exclusion of 
most D&O policies. 
It should be noted that 0&0 retention amounts tend to be 
relatively large compared with retention amounts available under 
stand-alone EPL policies. Many small or moderately sized EPL 
claims that would be covered by stand-alone EPL policies will fall 
within the retention of a 0&0 policy. Although endorsements to 
0&0 policies are available to overcome some of the above restric­
tions by making the entity as well as non-officer employees insureds 
under the policy, or extending coverage to non-officer employees, 
such endorsements typically do not change the retention amount 
under such policies. 
Another factor to consider is the potential depletion of policy 
limits for EPL claims, which could lessen the protection available 
for directors and officers. Particularly in the case of public corpora­
tions, the primary purpose of 0&0 insurance is to provide the di­
rectors and officers, and indirectly the corporation, protection in 
the event of a major shareholder class or derivative action. Indeed, 
individual officers or directors have little or no exposure to employ­
ment claims either because they do not have sufficient day-to-day 
involvement with the claimant to warrant liability or, in the case of 
Title VII and other federal anti-discrimination statutes, the prevail­
ing case law has limited liability to the employer alone. Thus, it is 
important that brokers and employers consider all of the implica­
164. At least one court has upheld this exclusion to deny coverage for an employ­
ment-related claim by an officer. See Foster v. Kentucky Hous. Corp., 850 F. Supp. 558, 
561 (E.D. Ky. 1994). But see Conklin Co. v. Nat'! Union Fire Ins. Co., CIV. No. 4-86­
860,1987 WL 108957, at *2 (D. Minn. Jan. 28, 1987) (finding that plaintiff sued in his 
capacity as a former employee, and not as a former officer). As more D&O EPL exten­
sions expand the definition of insureds to include managers, supervisory employees, 
and even all employees, care needs to be taken that the exclusion is modified to "carve 
out" employment-related claims by such individuals. Otherwise, for all practical pur­
poses, the extension of coverage becomes meaningless. 
282 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21:249 
tions of utilizing a D&O employment extension as a substitute for 
an independent EPL policy. 
CONCLUSION 
Although EPL policy forms have been on the market for most 
of this decade, coverage litigation involving employment claims 
under the policies discussed in this Article continue. While no in­
surance policy offers a financial guarantee, the EPL policy offers a 
certain level of comfort in that it is specifically written to provide 
insurance for most employment claims. Absent the EPL policy, the 
policyholder is left with the alternative of a wide variety of judicial 
interpretations of policy language under different claim scenarios. 
While the trend appears to be against finding coverage under these 
policies, contrary holdings, such as in the Schmidt case,165 still 
occur. 
Much can be said for the approach of purchasing EPL insur­
ance, while at the same time pursuing coverage under other policies 
in different claim situations. If more than one policy applies, the 
policyholder may enjoy the benefit of having additional policy lim­
its of liability with which to fund loss. In some cases, these other 
policies may also provide coverage for defense costs without erod­
ing coverage for any settlement or judgment amount and without 
being subject to a deductible. This thus "saves" the EPL policy lim­
its, in their entirety, to pay settlements and judgments. 
165. See supra notes 93-110 and accompanying text for a discussion of Schmidt. 
